We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We establish that gender identity -in particular, an aversion to the wife earning more than the husbandimpacts marriage formation, the wife's labor force participation, the wife's income conditional on working, satisfaction with the marriage, divorce, and the division of home production. The distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp cliff at 0.5, which suggests that a couple is less willing to match if her income exceeds his. Within marriage markets, when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man, marriage rates decline. Within couples, if the wife's potential income (based on her demographics) is likely to exceed the husband's, the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work. Couples where the wife earns more than the husband are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce. Finally, based on time use surveys, the gender gap in non-market work is larger if the wife earns more than the husband.
Introduction
Women have experienced substantial labor market gains over the last half century. The gender gap in labor force participation and the gender gap in earnings have both declined. Several factors have been identified as contributing to these gains. First This halted progress has led researchers to consider less traditional (within economics at least) factors that might influence the gender gap in labor market outcomes (Bertrand 2010) . One explanation that has gained popularity over the last decade is that slow-moving identity norms shape behavior. Influential work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000 , 2005 , 2008 ) imports insights about identity from social psychology into economics. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) define identity as one's sense of belonging to a social category, coupled with a view about how people who belong to that category should behave. They propose that identity influences economic outcomes because deviating from the prescribed behavior is inherently costly. In one application of this model, the two relevant social categories are man and woman, and these two categories are associated with specific behavioral prescriptions, such as "men work in the labor force and women work in the home" and "a man should earn more than his wife." If deviating from these prescriptions is costly, gender identity would lead to lower labor force participation and lower earnings for women. Does gender identity indeed impact the gender gap in labor market outcomes? Does it influence other outcomes, such as marriage formation and division of household chores? In this paper, we examine these questions, focusing on the behavioral prescription that "a man should earn more than his wife."
We first examine the distribution of the share of the household labor income earned by the wife.
Using 2008-2010 American Community Survey data on young couples, Panel (a) of Figure 1 (in Section 2) shows that this distribution exhibits a sharp drop to the right of 0.5 -when the wife starts to earn more than the husband. 1 This drop suggests that gender identity plays an important role in marriage formation. The other two panels of Figure 1 show the counterfactual distributions that would arise if matches were formed through costly search within marriage markets defined by age, race, and education. 2 The outcome in Panel (b) stems from the assumption that both men and women prefer partners with higher income. Panel (c) depicts the distribution that would arise if men dislike women's income once it exceeds their own. Only the distribution generated by gender identity norms (Panel (c)) shares the key distinctive feature of the true distribution -the sharp drop at 0.5.
We next turn from the analysis of who marries whom to the analysis of whether people get married at all. Using 1970 to 2010 data from the US Census Bureau, we show that, within a marriage market, when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man, the marriage rate declines. This relationship continues to hold when we flexibly control for both the distribution of men's income and the distribution of women's income. Moreover, to fully address concerns about omitted variables, we utilize a Bartik-style instrument (Bartik 1991 , Aizer 2010 ). We exploit the fact that historically men and women have tended to work in different industries. Based on the initial industry composition of a state and the industry-wide wage growth at the national level, we create sex-specific predicted distributions of local wages that result from aggregate shifts to labor demand that are plausibly uncorrelated with characteristics of men and women in a particular marriage market. We show that marriage rates decline when the predicted probability that a woman earns more than a man increases.
This result suggests a potential link between two important social developments over the last several decades: the relative increase in women's income potential (as discussed above) and the decline in marriage rates. Indeed, marriage rates declined substantially in the US, from about 81 percent in 1970 to 51 percent in 2010 for young adults aged 25 to 39. 3 Our estimates imply that the aversion to the situation where the wife earns more than the husband can explain 23 percent 1 Figures 3 and 4 , which draw on administrative data, show that this feature of the distribution is not driven by misreporting of income.
2 Details about our definition of marriage markets and the computation of the counterfactual distributions in Figure 1 are in Section 2. 3 The fact that marriage rates declined for older individuals as well -from 80 percent to 64 percent among those aged 40 to 65 -suggests that this decline does not solely reflect a change in the timing of marriages.
of this decline.
We then turn our attention from aggregate outcomes to individual couples. We first ask whether women whose potential income exceeds their husband distort their labor supply. Using 1970 to 2010 data from the US Census Bureau, for each married woman we estimate the distribution of her potential earnings based on her demographics. We show that when the probability that wife's potential income exceeds her husband's actual income is higher, the wife is less likely to participate in the labor force. Moreover, if she does work, the gap between her realized and potential income is higher. Both of these patterns suggest women distort their labor supply so as to avoid a gender-role reversal in earnings. One potential concern is that women who marry men whose income is below their own potential income have unobservable characteristics that keep them our the labor force or keep their realized income low. To address this issue, we construct an estimate of the probability that the wife's potential income exceeded the husband's income at the time of marriage; inclusion of this control does not affect our estimates.
Even though our results suggest that some couples try to avoid having the wife earn more than the husband, this situation has become quite common. Based on the 2008-2010 American Community Surveys, the wife earns more than the husband in 26 percent of the couples where both individuals are between 18 and 65 years old. In those couples, does the violation of gender identity norms influence the quality of marriage? Using panel data from the National Survey of Families and Households, we find that the couples where where the wife earns more than her husband report being less happy, report greater strife in their marriage, and are ultimately more likely to get a divorce.
Finally, we examine the relationship between relative income of the wife and the husband and the division of home production. Using the American Time Use Survey, we show that the gender gap in home production -how much more time the wife spends on non-market work than the husband -is larger in couples where the wife earns more than the husband. This result runs counter to standard models of the division of labor within the household (e.g., Becker 1973), which predict a negative relationship between the wife's share of market income and her relative contribution to home production activities. One explanation for the observed pattern is that, in couples where the wife earns more than her husband, the "threatening" wife takes on a greater share of housework so as to assuage the "threatened" husband's unease with the situation. The wife, of course, may ultimately get tired of working this "second shift" (Hochschild and Machung 1989) , which could be one of the mechanisms behind our results on divorce.
Since the initial work by Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 , the economic analysis of marriage markets has made great strides by developing tractable models that abstract from issues such as tradition and identity. Consequently, while empirical work on marriage formation, divorce, and bargaining within marriage is vast, there is limited empirical work on the role of gender identity in marriage. Fortin shows that the evolution of gender role attitudes over time correlates with the evolution of female labor force participation. In particular, while women's gender role attitudes steadily became less traditional (e.g. more and more women disagree with the notion that husbands should be the breadwinners and wives should be the homemakers) until the mid-1990s, these trends reversed in the mid-1990s, precisely at the time that coincides with the slowdown in the closing of the gender gap in labor force participation. Fernandez et al. (2004) document intergenerational transfer of attitudes toward gender roles. They show that a woman is more likely to work if her mother-in-law worked, presumably because having had a working mother influences the husband's attitudes toward gender. 4 These papers focus on how the variation in gender attitudes (across countries, across time, and across couples) correlate with women's labor force participation whereas our paper examines the extent to which the overall prevalence of traditional attitudes impacts a wide range of outcomes in the aggregate; in addition to women's labor force participation and the gender gap in income, we study the distribution of relative income within households, marriage rates, division of home production, marriage satisfaction, and divorce. 5 
Distribution of relative income
In standard models of the marriage market, men and women match based on how desirable each is relative to others of their gender; in each marriage market, the n th best man pairs up with the 4 Morrill and Morrill (2012) argue that, even though there is a stronger correlation in labor force participation between a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law than between a mother and a daughter, the data are consistent with a model where the preference transfer channel operates solely from mothers to daughters. 5 Using administrative data from Denmark, Pierce et al. (2012) employ a regression discontinuity design to argue that a husband is more likely to use erectile dysfunction medication if he earns less than his wife. n th best woman. 6 In these models, relative income -the share of the household income earned by the wife -plays no role. In this section, we demonstrate that the pattern of who marries whom suggests that couples are indeed sensitive to their relative income.
Census data from the US
We first analyze the distribution of relative income among young married couples, where wife is aged 22 to 31 and husband 24 to 33, using data from the American Community Survey 3-year aggregate (2008 to 2010). 7 We focus on the young couples in order to emphasize the impact of gender identity on marriage formation, rather than its impact on gender-specific evolution of income within marriage (which we study in the next section). 8 We focus on the most recent year because it yields the greatest overlap between the distributions of men's and women's income. 9 In the earlier decades (e.g., 1970 and 1980), there are fewer women whose income exceeds that of many men, so an aversion to forming a couple where the wife earns more than the husband has a smaller impact on the distribution of relative income. 10 In Figure 2 , we plot the distribution of relative income in each decade since 1970.
We define relativeIncome i as wif eIncome i wif eIncome i +husbIncome i where i indexes the couples, and wif eIncome i and husbIncome i are the labor income of the wife and the husband, respectively.
We only include couples where both the wife and the husband earn a positive income. In the Census there are many couples where relativeIncome i is exactly equal to 1 2 , which seems somewhat implausible and is likely to be an artifact of the survey method. 11 (In the administrative data we use in the next two subsections there are not nearly as many couples where the husband and the wife earn the same amount.) Accordingly, we recode those observations using a triangular kernel; this eliminates the "spike" in the distribution of relativeIncome i at 1 2 . 12 6 This is the equilibrium outcome if utility is non-transferable or if wife's and husband's qualities are complements. If partner's qualities are substitutes and utility is transferable, then the best man pairs up with the worst woman and vice verse.
7 This corresponds to the youngest age group in our construction of the marriage markets in Section 3. 8 Results are qualitatively similar if we include all couples regardless of their age. 9 Our results are similar if we use data from 1990 or 2000 instead. 10 When the distribution of men's income first order stochastically dominates the distribution of women's income in every marriage market, the unique stable matching under the identity-based preferences (as defined below) is positive assortative matching, i.e., the same as under standard preferences. Likewise, under the stochastic matching process we use below, identity-based and standard preferences generate similar counterfactual outcomes in the earlier decades when the distributions of men's and women's income are further apart.
11 Changes in marginal tax rate can cause bunching at particular levels of income (Chetty et al. 2011) , which could in turn cause a husband and wife to choose the exact same income, but the magnitude of bunching in the United States is insufficient to explain the observed spike in the distribution of relative income. 12 In other words, when we plot a histogram with n bins, bin k ∈ {1, ..., n} is assigned a share
of the . This suggests that that couples may have an aversion to the wife earning more than the husband. In Panels (b) and (c) we depict counterfactual distributions of relative income that would arise under standard and identity-based preferences, respectively. For both panels, we use the data on all individuals in the relevant age group, whether married or not.
We assign each individual to a marriage market, based on state, race, 13 and a binary education group based on whether they have at least some college education. Then, given ordinal preferences for partners, we run the following algorithm. In each marriage market, a woman and a man are picked at random. The man proposes to the woman with a probability equal to
where N W is the number of women in the marriage market and k is the rank of the woman according to the man's preferences. Hence, the man proposes to his favorite woman with probability 1 and to his least favorite woman with probability
. If the man proposes, the woman accepts with a probability equal to
where N M is the number of men in the marriage market and k is the rank of the man according to the woman's preferences. If the the woman accepts the man's proposal, they are matched and removed from the pool of singles. The algorithm proceeds until the total number of matches is the minimum of the number of married men and the number of married women in that marriage market.
Under standard preferences, we assume that both men and women always prefer a partner with a higher income. 14 Under identity-based preferences, we assume that women always prefer a partner with a higher income, but a man with income h has an ordinal utility for a woman with income w equal to − |h − w|. In other words, a man values women's income as long as it does not observations whose value is exactly 1 2
. 13 The three races we consider are white, black, and Hispanic. We drop individuals of other races. 14 As far as we know, there are no tax-based reasons why couples should care about relative income. Panels (b) and (c) make it clear that identity-based preferences generate the key qualitative feature of the actual distribution of relative income, namely the sharp drop in the distribution when a woman earns more than her husband. 15 Unsurprisingly, standard preferences do not exhibit such a drop. Thus, the distribution of relative income suggests an important role of gender identity in marriage formation. 15 Even though identity-based preferences generate this qualitative feature of the actual distribution, they do not do a better job of matching the overall distribution. Under the Wasserstein metric, the distance between the distributions in Panels (c) and (a) is not smaller than the distance between the distributions in Panels (b) and (a). Moreover, some other features of the data, such as the relationship between a woman's income and the likelihood that she is married, are not matched well by the identity-based counterfactual. 
Administrative data from the US
One potential issue with Figure 1 is that income is self-reported. Thus, it is in principle possible that the apparent cliff at 0.5 is due to misreporting. 16 To address this issue, in this subsection we The distribution of relative income is qualitatively the same as in Figures 1 and 2 . Most importantly, the distribution exhibits a sharp drop at the point where the wife starts to earn more than the husband. The advantages of this dataset relative to both the American Community Survey and SIPP are clear, but LAD has its disadvantages as well. In particular, we were unable to gain direct access to the data or write our own code to conduct the analyses. All of the analysis was conducted by research assistants employed by Statistics Canada. Due to logistical obstacles with LAD we focus on publicly available US datasets for most of the paper, but in this subsection we use the Canadian data to generate a more precise distribution of relative income.
Administrative data from Canada
We construct a dataset where the level of observation is couple by year. We include all married couples as long as at least one individual in the couple has strictly positive income. Our sample thus includes over 60 million couple-year observations. Each person's income is defined as their total income, inclusive of labor income, investment income, pensions, net business income and other sources. We recoded any strictly negative individual income as zero. The histogram in Figure 4 depicts the distribution of relative income with fraction of couple-years in each of the 100 bins indicated on the left vertical axis. Note that, unlike in the previous figures, couples where the wife or the husband has no income are included. As in the US data, Figure 4 indicates a sharp decrease in the number of couples once the wife's income exceeds the husband's. who divorce during the year. In particular, we code a couple-year i, t as divorcing in year t if the couple was married in year t and both spouses are alive but not married to each other in year t + 1. Remarkably, divorce rate seems independent of relative income as long as the wife earns less than the husband, but once the wife earns more than the husband, the divorce rate increases with relative income. 18 The magnitude of the increase is also substantial, with the divorce rate 18 There is also a curious small spike in the distribution of relative income and a dip in the likelihood of divorce at to each other. Accordingly, we define marriage markets based on the state of residence, race, age group, and education group. The three race groups we consider are whites, blacks, and Hispanics. 20 The three age groups are (i) 22 to 31 for women and 24 to 33 for men (ii) 32 to 41 for women and 34 to 43 for men and (iii) 42 to 51 for women and 44 to 53 for men. The two education groups are (i) high school degree or less and (ii) some college or more. Appendix Table 1 documents sorting along these dimensions. For example, 98% of wives who are white are married to a husband who is white, 21 73% of wives with a high school degree or less are married to a husband with similar educational qualifications, 22 and 76% of wives aged 22 to 31 are married to a husband aged 24 to 33. 23 Overall, 56% of all marriages are between a man and woman from the same marriage market.
Given a particular marriage market, we wish to know how the changes in women's income relative to that of men affect marriage market outcomes. For each marriage market m and year t ∈ {1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010} we compute how likely it is, when a woman encounters a man, that her income exceeds his. Specifically, given woman i and man j, consider a binary variable that takes value 1 if i's income exceeds j's. We define P rW omanEarnsM ore mt as the mean of this variable taken across all possible couples. Operationally, we construct this variable by randomly drawing 50,000 women and men with replacement and computing the share of couples where the woman earns more than the man.
We consider several measures of income. First, we use individuals' actual earnings, where we code an individual as having zero income if he or she is not in the labor force. Second, we construct a measure of predicted earnings based on demographic characteristics. In particular, within each marriage market, we assign each woman and man in a census year to a demographic group defined 20 We drop individuals of other races. 21 The fraction of married women in a same-race marriage is 97% and 82% for blacks and Hispanics, respectively. For a broader discussion of same-race marriages in the United States, see Fisman et al. (2008) 22 This fraction is 76% for wives with some college or more. 23 These fractions are 70% and 68% for the other two age groups.
based on age (three-year intervals), education (less than high school, high-school, some college, college, more than college), race, and state of residence. We then assign potential income to each individual by drawing from the earnings distribution within those in the individual's demographic group who have positive income. Finally, we construct distributions of relative income based on a Bartik-style instrument to isolate the variation in relative earnings which is plausibly unrelated to the factors that directly affect the marriage market.
Across all census years and marriage markets, the likelihood that a randomly chosen woman earns more than a randomly chosen man is about 0.25 (using either measure of income). This likelihood has increased steadily over time, going from 11-14% in 1970 to about 31-32% in 2010. 24 More importantly for our purposes, these dynamics have varied across marriage markets. 25 Thus, there is ample variation in P rW omanEarnsM ore mt even when we include marriage market and year fixed effects. Note that this residual variation stems both from compositional shifts within a marriage market over time and from shocks that differentially affect men and women within a marriage market. When we turn to our instrumental variables approach, we will isolate the component of the latter source of variation which stems for US-wide changes in labor demand across industries.
Our baseline OLS specification is the following:
M aleM arried mt = β 1 P rW omanEarnsM ore mt
+ β 2 lnW omensIncome mt + β 3 lnM ensIncome mt
The unit of observation is a marriage market in a census year. M aleM arried mt is the share of males who are currently married. 26 Variables lnW omensIncome mt and lnM ensIncome mt are the logs of the average female and male income, respectively. All specifications include marriage market fixed effects (α m ) and year fixed effects (δ t ) interacted with the age group, the education group, the race, and the state of residence. Inclusion of marriage market fixed effects controls for any timeinvariant unobserved differences across marriage markets. Inclusion of year fixed effects controls 24 See Appendix Table 2 for summary statistics. 25 See Appendix Table 3 . 26 We get similar results if we use the share of females who are married.
for any aggregate temporal variation in marriage rates. We also include the interaction of year fixed effects with the demographic determinants of the marriage market because the relationship between these demographic variables and marriage rates may have changed over time. Standard errors are clustered by state and each observation is weighted by the number of women in the marriage market.
This baseline specification is in Column (1) of Table 1 . The estimate of β 1 is −0.181 and is marginally significant (p = 0.078). Column (2) includes a set of additional marriage market by year controls: the sex ratio, male and female incarceration rate, average years of schooling for men and women, and the number of men and women in the market. With this specification, the estimated effect becomes stronger β 1 = −0.307 and highly significant (p < 0.01). Finally, in Column (3) we control for men and women's income more flexibly, including the income at each decile, i.e., the 10th to 90th percentile of the distribution of both men and women's income in the marriage market that year. The estimate of β 1 is −0.192 (p < 0.05). Thus, all three specifications point to the importance of gender-identity in individuals' decision on whether to get married.
In Columns (4) through (6) we consider the same three specifications, but we construct the variable P rW omanEarnsM ore mt using potential income. Once again, the estimate of β 1 is consistently negative. Moreover, the estimate is very stable across the three specifications, ranging from −0.214 to −0.199, and always highly significant (p < 0.01).
The identifying assumption behind these specifications is that P rW omanEarnsM ore mt is uncorrelated with unobserved shocks to factors that might influence marriage rates. The robustness of our estimates to the inclusion of flexible controls for the distribution of men and women's income (Columns (3) and (6)) ameliorates concerns about many omitted variables, but to provide further support for our causal interpretation, we now turn to an instrumental variables approach.
Historically, men and women have tended to work in different industries (e.g. women are overrepresented in services and men in construction and manufacturing). Based on the industry composition of the state and the industry-wide wage changes at the national level, we can thus isolate sex-specific variation in local wages that is driven solely by aggregate labor demand, which is presumably uncorrelated with the characteristics of workers in a given marriage market level. This approach builds on previous work by Bartik (1991) and Aizer (2010) . In contrast to previous uses of the "Bartik instrument," which focus on changes in average wages, we construct an instrument for the entire distribution of potential income in each marriage market.
We begin by calculating average yearly wages by gender and marriage market as follows:
where g indexes gender, r race, e education-group, a age-group, s state, j industry 27 and t census year. Variable w g reajt,−s is the average wage in year t in industry j for workers of a given gender, race, education and age-group in the nation, excluding state s. Variable γ We report results using both base years.
Variablew g mt is strongly correlated with the actual mean income of gender g in marriage market m in year t: states that initially had relatively more women in industries that subsequently experienced wage growth at the national level tend to have more growth in women's income relative to that of men. But, unlike the variation in actual income, variation inw g mt over time is driven by aggregate shocks and is thus plausibly orthogonal to factors that might directly influence marriage rates in market m.
Similarly, we wish to construct a measure of the entire distribution of income by gender which is driven solely by aggregate shocks. We modify the standard Bartik instrument to compute predicted yearly wages at the p = {5th, 10th, 15th, ..., 90th, 95th) percentile.
Specifically, letw
where w g,p reajt,−s is the p th percentile of the national income distribution in year t in industry j for workers of a given gender, race, education and age-group, excluding state s. A priori, it is not clear thatw g,p mt will be correlated with the p th percentile of gender g's distribution in market mt. For example, if half the women in a demographic group m work in some industry j high where the minimum income is y high and half the women in m work in some industry j low where the maximum 27 We consider 12 industry groups: (1) Agriculture (2) income is y low < y high , increase in the 5th percentile of wages in industry j high will not raise the 5th percentile of wages of women in market m. Luckily for us, however, this example has little empirical relevance -a posteriori it turns out that the distributions defined by {w g,p mt } p indeed correlate with the actual distributions of income. In other words, the Bartik instrument has a strong "first stage" when it is used to predict how the distribution of income varies across markets.
This modification to the standard Bartik measure allows us to construct a measure of P rW omanEarnsM ore mt whose variation over time is orthogonal to local labor market conditions. Specifically, we draw from the distributions defined by {w g,p mt } p , and calculate the likelihood that a randomly chosen women earns more than a randomly chosen man. Column (7) reports the baseline specification from Equation (1) usingw g mt andw g,p mt with the 1970 base year to construct measures of P rW omanEarnsM ore mt , lnW omensIncome mt , and lnM ensIncome mt . As in other specifications, the estimate of β 1 is negative and significant (p < 0.01). Moreover, given this estimate β 1 = −0.438 the effect of the likelihood that a woman earns more than a man on marriage rates is economically significant. A 10 percentage point increase in this likelihood decreases marriage rates by 4.4 percentage points. In Column (8) we include a set of additional marriage market by year controls. The estimate declines to -0.317, but remains significant at the 1% level. Finally, in Column (9), we include controls for the predicted yearly wages of the 10th to 90th percentile for wives and husbands in the marriage market market that year. The estimate ofβ 1 declines to -0.234 and is no longer statistically significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the estimate remains sizable and is economically significant (the magnitude is similar to that of the baseline specification using predicted earnings in Column (4)). Finally, in Columns (10)- (12) we consider the same specifications as in Columns (7)- (9) but with 1980 as the base year for the Bartik instrument. All of the estimates are again negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05 for all specifications).
Taken together, these results highlight the importance of the relative distribution of men and women's income in marriage markets. The estimate from our preferred specification (Column (12)) implies that the secular increase in the aggregate likelihood that a woman earns more than a man explains 23 percent of the decline in the rates of marriage from 1970 to 2010. 28 We should note that the relative distribution of men and women's income might influence the formation of marriage even in the absence of gender identity considerations. In Beckerian models of the marriage market, one of the key benefits of marriage is specialization. Specialization, in 28 The coefficient −0.347 multiplied by the 20 percentage point increase in P rW omanEarnsM ore (Appendix Table  2 ) is 23% of the 30 percentage point decrease in marriage rates.
turn, is more valuable if a man and a woman have different opportunities in the marriage market.
As the gender gap in a marriage market narrows (and P rW omanEarnsM ore increases), there are smaller "gains from trade" that can be achieved through marriage. This force alone might account for our negative estimate of β 1 . That said, evidence we present in other sections of this paper is in direct conflict with the standard models of the marriage market. For example, the relationship between relative income and the division of household chores (Section 6) is the opposite of what one would expect in the absence of gender-identity considerations. Thus, the view that couples have an aversion to the wife earning more than the husband provides a more parsimonious explanation of the patterns we present in this paper.
Wife's labor supply and relative income
The previous sections establish that couples where the wife's potential income would exceed the husband's are less likely to form. When such couples do form, we might expect gender-identity to distort labor market outcomes. In particular, a wife who might be threatening to her husband were she to join the workforce full-time (because her income would exceed his) may end up staying at home or she might distort her labor supply in other ways -e.g., work fewer hours or take a job where HusbIncome i is the husband's income.
Thus, whether the wife works or not, P rW if eEarnsM ore i captures the likelihood that she would earn more than her husband if her income were a random draw from the population of working women in her demographic group. 29 Summary statistics for this sample are presented in Appendix Table 4 . Across all census years, 29 As we discuss in Subsection 4.2, the income of the women who do work may also be distorted by gender-identity considerations. Thus, the distribution of income we identify is not the distribution of potential income, as it is usually construed, but rather the distribution of the income that the wife would likely earn were she to join the labor force. 
Labor force participation
We first examine wives' labor force participation. One of the strongest ways to conform to traditional gender roles is for the wife to stay at home while the husband plays the role of breadwinner.
Might it be the case that when gender identity is threatened by the possibility that the wife would be the primary provider (in a sense that her income would exceed the husband's), some couples retreat to traditional gender roles? Given a couple i, let wif eLF P i be a binary variable equal to 1 if the wife is in the labor force.
In Column (1) of Table 2 , we consider, as the baseline specification, a linear probability model
where lnHusbIncome i is the logarithm of husband's income, w p i are controls for the wife's potential income at each of the vigintiles and X i represents non-income controls: year fixed effects, state fixed effects, the wife and the husband's race, the wife and the husband's 5-year age-group, and the wife and the husband's education group. 30 Standard errors are clustered by the wife's demographic group (which pins down the distribution of her potential income). The baseline estimate of β 1 is −0.254 (p < 0.01). In principle, husband's income might impact the marginal utility of household income non-linearly, so in Column (2) we include a cubic polynomial in lnHusbIncome i . The estimate of β 1 falls but remains economically and statistically significant at −0.182 (p < 0.01). A 10 percentage point increase in the probability that a wife would earn more than her husband reduces the likelihood that she will participate in the labor force by 1.8 percentage points. Put differently, a one standard deviation (across all years) increase in the probability that a wife would earn more than her husband reduces the likelihood that she participates in the labor force by 4.5 percentage points.
One concern with the interpretation ofβ 1 is that the impact of wife's potential income might interact with husband's income for reasons that are separate from the couple's concern that the wife might earn more than the husband. For instance, suppose that the impact of the wife's expected income on her labor force participation is smaller when the husband's income is high. In this case, we would spuriously estimate a positive β 1 even though whether the wife makes more than the husband does not matter. To deal with this issue, in Column (3) we add a control for the median of wife's predicted income w 50 i interacted with the income of the husband. The estimate of β 1 is unaffected.
Yet another concern is that a woman who is willing to marry a man whose income is below her potential income might have unobservable characteristics that keep her out of the labor force.
For example, highly educated women that marry men with very low earnings might be systematic underachievers or systematically lack confidence. To address these concerns about selection in marriage, in Column (4) we include a control for a proxy of the relative income at marriage. In this specification, the coefficient β 1 is estimated based on the variation in P rW if eEarnsM ore i that is driven by the changes that occur after marriage. For most decades, we do not have data on the year of marriage nor on relative income at the time of marriage. 31 Thus, we proxy for the relative income of spouses at the time of marriage as follows. For each couple, we define the year of marriage as the year when the wife turned 25. We then look for the census year that is the closest to year at marriage. We drop couples for which the absolute value of the distance between year at marriage and closest census year is more than 5 years. We then compute the probability that the wife earned more than her husband at marriage based on their demographics, using the same procedure as before. When we include this control to the baseline specification, the estimate of β 1 remains virtually identical to that in Columns (2) and (3) at -0.17. In Column (5), we include indicator variables for the interaction between the wife's demographic group and the husband's demographic group. The addition of these additional fixed effects increases the estimate of β 1 slightly. The fact that our estimate is very stable as we include a range of additional controls suggests that, to the extent that the observable characteristics in our data are representative of unobservables, the negative value ofβ 1 is not due to an omitted variable bias (Altonji et al. 2005 ). 31 The American Community Survey does provide information about the year of marriage. In future drafts, we plan to utilize this information to construct better controls for relative income at marriage.
Finally, to further buttress the view that the correlation between variables wif eLF P i and P rW if eEarnsM ore i is not driven by unobservable skills of the wife, we consider wife's unemployment as a placebo dependent variable. If the relationship between these variables is caused by unobservable skill, we would expect that P rW if eEarnsM ore i is also positively related to unemployment. As Column (6) shows, when we consider wife's employment as the outcome variable, the coefficient on P rW if eEarnsM ore i is precisely estimated to be close to zero (and is, if anything, negative -suggesting that, conditional on observables, a wife whose income would exceed her husband's is more successful in the labor market).
Overall, while we do not have a fully exogenous source of variation in P rW if eEarnsM ore i , the data strongly suggest that married women sometimes stay out of the labor force so as to avoid a situation where they would become the primary breadwinner.
Gap between potential and realized income
Having the wife leave the labor force is a very costly way to restore traditional gender roles. It would be less costly for the wife to simply reduce her earnings to a level that does not threaten the husband's status as the primary breadwinner. In this subsection, we present evidence for such behavior.
Given a couple i, let incomeGap ij = wif eIncome i −wif eP otential i wif eP otential i where wif eP otential i is simply the mean of the distribution of potential earnings for the wife, as defined in the previous subsection.
To emphasize the distortions in income for women who do not leave the workforce, we first focus on the sample of couples where the woman is working. In Column (1) of Table 3 , we consider the baseline OLS specification:
The estimate of β 1 is -0.094 (p < 0.01). Including a cubic polynomial of lnHusbIncome i in Column (2) strengthens the effect:β 1 = −0.174 (p < 0.01). Women that are more threatening to their husband given their potential systematically underperform in the labor market. A 10 percentage point increase in the probability that a wife would would earn more than her husband increases the gap between wife's actual earnings and wife's potential earnings by 1.7 percentage points. Put differently, a one standard deviation increase in the probability increases the gap in wife's actual and potential earnings by 4.4 percentage points.
Columns (3)- (5) of Table 3 consider the same robustness checks as in the previous subsection.
In Column (3) we add an interaction between the median of the wife's potential income and the husband's income. In Column (4) we include a control for the (proxied) relative income at marriage.
In Column (5) we include fixed effects for the wife's demographic group dummies interacted with the husband's demographic group dummies. In all the specifications, the estimate of β 1 remains negative and highly statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient is quite stable once we include a polynomial control for the husband's income.
Once again, these results suggest that gender-identity considerations affect the labor supply of women and are likely to be an important factor in the continued gender gap in realized earnings.
In Column (6) of Table 3 , we consider the same sample as in the baseline specification of Table 2, i.e., we include women who are out of the labor force. For women who are out of the labor force, we set wif eIncome i to zero, so for those women the incomeGap i variable is very negative. We thus estimate the income gap that reflects both the decreased likelihood of a woman working and a lower income when she does work. Not surprisingly, given the results we already discussed, an increase in the probability that a wife would earn more than her husband makes the gap between the wife's actual earnings and her potential earnings more negative. A 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood that the wife would earn more than her husband increases the gap between her actual earnings and her potential earnings by 3.6 percentage points (p < 0.01). Equivalently, a one standard deviation increase in P rW if eEarnsM ore i raises the income gap by 9 percentage points.
Finally, our baseline specification restrict the coefficients on all the control variables to be the same across census years. To allow for the possibility that the factors that influence women's labor supply change over time, in Columns (7) and (8), we estimate the baseline specification separately for 1970 and 2010. In each time period, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the earnings gap and the likelihood that the wife would earn more than her husband.
In summary, women's labor supply decisions seem to be distorted in situations where there is a threat that they might become the primary bread winner. In the next section we document some of the costs that arise when the woman does end up earning more than the husband. The presence of these costs provides a potential "rationalization" for the labor market distortions that we document here.
Marital stability and relative earnings
Does relative earnings affect marital stability? To address this question, we exploit the rich information on marital satisfaction and marital outcomes from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). The NSFH is a nationally representative survey of US households and includes approximately 9,500 households that were followed over three waves from 1988 to 2002. We use data from the first two waves (1987-88 and 1992-94) of the survey. 32 We restrict our analysis to couples where both the wife and the husband are between 18 and 65 years old and at least one person in the household has positive income. Our sample consists of approximately 4,000 married couples.
The NSFH has three questions on marital stability. One asks: "Taking things all together, how would you describe your marriage?" Respondents can choose answers from a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 7 (very happy). Close to 50% of wives and husbands reported being "very happy" in their current marriage. We define a binary variable happyM arriage i that indicates whether the answer is "very happy." The second question asks: "During the past year, have you ever thought that your marriage might be in trouble?" We define a binary variable marriageT rouble i that indicates an affirmative response. The third question asks: "During the past year, have you and your husband/wife discussed the idea of separating?" We define a binary variable discussSeparation i that indicates whether the answer is affirmative.
The NSFH also provides information on the wife's and the husband's labor income, 33 on the basis of which we define self-explanatory variables lnW if eIncome i , lnHusbIncome i , and lnT otIncome i . 34 For each couple we also compute relativeIncome i , the share of the household income earned by the wife. In Wave 1, the mean of relativeIncome i is 0.27 and it exceeds 1 2 in 15% of households. We define wif eEarnsM ore i as a binary variable equal to 1 if relativeIncome i > 1 2 . Summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are in Appendix Table 5 .
In Table 4 , we examine how the relative income within the household affects answers to these 32 We do not use the third wave of the NSFH as it only samples a subset (approximately 70%) of the original main respondents due to budgetary limitations. Furthermore, the Wave 3 sample did not include new spouses or partners currently living with the main respondent if different from the spouse or partner in Wave 1. 33 The earnings measures include the wage, salary and self-employment income. In the NSFH, the income information was collected via self-administered questionnaires completed separately by the main respondent and his/her spouse. When possible, the questionnaire was given to the spouse at the beginning of the main interview, to be conducted in another room. If this was not possible, the questionnaire was left in a sealed envelope for the spouse to complete at a later time. See http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/nsfhwp/nsfh1.pdf for further details.
34 Both in this and in the next section, we set lnW if eIncome = −1 if the wife's income is equal to zero and in all regressions we include an indicator variable for whether the wife's income was zero. We apply the same procedure for the husband's income. survey questions. Our baseline specification is a linear probability model
where Y i is the answer to the survey question, X i represents non-income controls: region fixed effects, 35 indicator variables for whether the wife is working, whether the husband is working, the wife and the husband's race and education groups, and a quadratic in wife's and husband's age. 36 As Column (1) of Table 4 shows, the wife tends to be less happy with the marriage, is more likely to report that her marriage is in trouble and is more likely to have discussed separation in the past year if she earns more than her husband. In Column (2), we add more flexible income controls, namely cubic polynomials of lnW if eIncome i and lnHusbIncome i . The estimate of β 1 is unaffected. Since gender-identity is more plausibly associated with a prescription that "the husband should earn more than the wife" than with a prescription that "it is better for the wife to earn 20% rather than 30% of the household income," the gender-identity explanation forβ 1 < 0 implies that the variation in relativeIncome i that does not change the value of wif eEarnsM ore i should have a lesser effect on happiness. Accordingly, in Column (3) we include relativeIncome i as an additional control to the baseline specification. The impact of wif eEarnsM ore on happyM arriage is now somewhat smaller and is no longer statistically significant, but the impact on the other two survey questions, marriageT rouble and discussSeparation is unaffected. Taken together, it seems that relative income within a household matters only if it makes the wife the primary breadwinner.
In Columns (4)- (6) we consider the same three specifications, but with husband's responses to the same questions as the outcome variable. The results are largely similar. Finally, in the last three columns of table 4, we pool the husband and wife responses. In these specifications, we include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is the husband or the wife and we cluster standard errors at the level of the couple. In our preferred specification (Column (9)), we find that if the wife earns more than the husband, spouses are 7 percentage points (15%) less likely to report that their marriage is very happy, 8 percentage points (32%) more likely to report marital troubles in the past year and 6 percentage points (46%) more likely to have discussed separating in the past year.
35 State identifiers are not available in the public-use version of the NSFH. 36 We weight the observations using the couple-level weights. The NSFH provides two sets of weights; a person-level weight and a couple-level weight. Results are similar whether we use no weights, person-level weights, or couple-level weights.
At first thought, one might be tempted to use the difference between the coefficients on the wife and the husband's responses to determine whether it is wife or the husband who dislikes the reversal of traditional gender roles. We suspect that such a comparison is not particularly useful.
If say the husband is initially the one who is unhappy, he may start to behave in the ways that make the wife unhappy, perhaps even more so. Such a possibility echoes Al Roth's Iron Law of Marriage: you cannot be happier than your spouse (Roth 2008 ).
Next, we turn away from survey data to the revealed stability of marriage. For each couple in Wave 1 (1987-88), we construct a binary variable divorced i which is equal to 1 if the couple is separated or divorced when they are re-interviewed in Wave 2 (1992-94). In Column (1) of Table   5 , we consider the baseline linear probability model:
where all of the independent variables are measured in Wave 1. In Column (2), we control more flexibly for the wife's and the husband's earnings (Column (2)). In both specifications we find that when the wife earns more than the husband, the likelihood of divorce increases by about 6 percentage points (p < 0.05). Since 12% of couples in the sample get divorced by Wave 2, this estimate implies that having the wife earn more than husband increases the likelihood of divorce by 50 percent. In Column (3), we including a control for relative earnings. The estimate decreases slightly to about 5 percentage points and becomes less significant (p = 0.11). Overall, our data suggests that departing from the traditional gender roles increases the likelihood of divorce. 37 6 Home production and relative income Traditional gender roles also contain prescriptions about the division of chores within the households. In this section, we explore whether, when the wife earns more than the husband, she or he adjusts her contribution to home production activities so as to alleviate the sense of gender-role 37 Separation or divorce occurs when the marriage fully breaks down and can be regarded as the end-point of marital instability. Among couples that remain married in both survey waves, we can also examine whether wif eEarnsM ore in Wave 1 is associated with a deterioration in reported marital stability. We find some evidence that this is true (although most of the point estimates are not statistically significant). Conditional on Wave 1 responses, in marriages where the wife earns more than the husband, wives and husbands generally report (in Wave 2) that their marriages are less happy and that they have discussed separation. We do not find similar effects for the marriageT rouble outcome (see Appendix Table 6 ).
reversal.
We use data from the ATUS/CPS, covering the years 2003 to 2011. As in the previous section, we restrict our analysis to couples where both the wife and the husband are between 18 and 65 years old and at least one person in the household has positive income. For each individual in the sample, we compute the total amount of time spent in non-market work and child care, measured in the number of hours per week. Following Aguiar and Hurst (2007), we define total number of hours spent in non-market work (chores i ) as the sum of time spent in "core" non-market work (which includes activities such as meal preparation and cleanup, doing laundry, ironing, dusting, vacuuming, and indoor household cleaning), time spent "obtaining goods and services" (such as grocery shopping) and time spent in "other" home production activities such as home maintenance, outdoor cleaning, vehicle repair, gardening, and pet care. We define total number of hours spent in child care (childcare i ) as the sum of time spent in primary child care (such as changing diapers and feeding the child), educational child care (such as helping a child with her homework) and recreational child care (such as playing games with children or taking them to the zoo). We define totN onM arketW ork i as the sum chores i and childcare i .
For each individual i in the sample, we define lnW if eIncome i and lnHusbIncome i and lnT otIncome i based on the weekly earnings reported in the CPS interviews. Based on these earnings we define relativeIncome i and wif eEarnsM ore i as before. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table 7 . Wives spend on average of 24.1 hours and 9.4 hours per week on chores and child care, respectively. For husbands, these numbers are 15.7 hours and 5.1 hours, respectively. Mean relative income is 0.34 and the wife earns more than the husband in 16 percent of the couples.
Ideally, we would like to compare the wife-husband gap in time spent on home production across couples where the wife earns more than the husband and those where she does not. Unfortunately, the ATUS/CPS only includes one respondent per household. Thus, to analyze how relative income impacts the division of home production, we will focus on the interaction between the impact of gender and the impact of relative income on time use. Specifically, in Column (1) of Panel (a) in Table 6 , we consider the baseline OLS model:
where X i includes year, state, and day of the week fixed effects, indicator variables for whether the wife is working, whether the husband is working, the wife and the husband's race and education groups, and a quadratic in wife's and husband's age. Our coefficient of interest is β 1 . A positive estimate of β 1 would indicate that, ceterus paribus, in couples where the wife earns more than the husband, she also spends more hours doing non-market work and childcare. The estimate of β 1 is 1.36 (p < 0.05). In Column (2) we include more flexible cubic polynomial controls for the wife's and the husband's income. The estimate of β 1 is similar at 1.64 (p < 0.05). In Column (3) we include relativeIncome i as a control. The estimate of β 1 increases to 2.19 (p < 0.01). Thus, once again we see that relative income is particularly important if it implies a reversal in traditional gender roles. 38 In Column (4), we add, to the baseline specification, controls for the presence of children of different ages in the household. Specifically, we add indicator variables for whether there is no child, the youngest child is younger than 3, the youngest child is between 4 and 6 years of age, or the youngest child is older than 6. The estimate remains largely unchanged. Finally, our results are robust to restricting the sample to time-use during week-days only (Column (5)). In Panels (b) and (c) we consider the same specifications, but consider the two components of total non-market work, chores i and childcare i , separately. The estimates suggest that most if not all of the effects on total non-market work are driven by chores rather than childcare.
In summary, our analysis of the time use data suggests that gender identity considerations may lead a woman who seems threatening to her husband because she earns more than he does to engage in a larger share of home production activities, particularly household chores. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) report that women do not undertake less than half of the housework even if they work or earn more than the husband. Our finding is even more striking; the (reverse) gender gap in non-market work is greater when the wife earns more than the husband.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the view that gender identity norms, and in particular the norm that "a man should earn more than his wife," impact a wide range of social and economic outcomes. In particular, we argue that the prevalence of this norm helps explain the distribution of relative income within US households, patterns of marriage, divorce and women's labor market attachment, and the division of home production activities between husbands and wives.
By definition, the gender identity norm that we focus on in this paper would be of no relevance in a world where a woman could never earn more than her (potential or actual) husband. The relative gains in women's labor market opportunities over the last half century, however, have turned gender identity into a binding constraint, with real economic and social consequences. We suspect that the changes in women's relative income are particularly important because they happened quickly in comparison to the slow-moving social norms and concepts of gender.
While our empirical work focuses on the US, rapid gains in women's labor market opportunities are not unique to the US. Even more rapid changes have taken place in developed Asian countries, such as Korea and Japan. At the same time, these Asian countries have experienced large declines in marriage rates and fertility among educated women. As suggested by Hwang (2012) , the interaction of economic growth and intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes might play an important part in these developments.
In future work, we would like to better understand the long-run determinants of gender identity.
While the evidence in this paper suggests that the behavioral prescription that "a man should earn more than his wife" helps explain economic and social outcomes even in the most recent decade, this does not imply that this prescription is as strong today as it was in the past. How are gender identity norms evolving in the face of market forces that are making those norms more costly? (2008) (2009) (2010) . Level of observation is marriage market by decade. All specifications include marriage market fixed effects, decade fixed effects, and the decade interacted with the age group, the education group, the race, and the state of residence. PrWomanEarnsMore is the probability that a randomly chosen woman earns more than a randomly chosen man. See text for further details. Regressions are weighted by the number of women in the marriage market. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. [2008] [2009] [2010] . Sample consists of couples where both the wife and the husband are between 18 and 65 years old and the husband is working. PrWifeEarnsMore is the probability that wife's income would exceed the husband's if her income were drawn from the distribution of positive earnings in the wife's demographic group. Variable lnHusbIncome is the log of husband's income. Variable lnMedianWifePotential is the log of the median of the distribution of positive earnings in the wife's demographic group. All regressions include controls for log of husband's income, vigintiles of the wife's potential income, wife's and husband's education (5 categories), wife's and husband's 5-year age group, wife's and husband's race and state fixed effects. Variable relativeEarningsAtMarriage is the probability that income drawn from the distribution of positive earnings in the wife's demographic group exceeds income drawn from the distribution of positive earnings in the husband's demographic group in the year they got married (proxied by the closest census year to the year the wife turned 25). Standard errors are clustered at the wife's demographic group. ***significant at 1% level, **at 5%, *at 1%.
Wife in the labor force (2008) (2009) (2010) . The unrestricted sample consists of couples where both the wife and the husband are between 18 and 65 years old and the husband is working. PrWifeEarnsMore is the probability that wife's income would exceed the husband's if her income were drawn from the distribution of positive earnings in the wife's demographic group. Variable lnHusbIncome is the log of husband's income. Variable lnMedianWifePotential is the log of the median of the distribution of positive earnings in the wife's demographic group. All regressions include controls for log of husband's income, vigintiles of the wife's potential income, wife's and husband's education (5 categories), wife's and husband's 5-year age group, wife's and husband's race and state fixed effects. Variable relativeEarningsAtMarriage is the probability that income drawn from the distribution of positive earnings in the wife's demographic group exceeds income drawn from the distribution of positive earnings in the husband's demographic group in the year they got married (proxied by the closest census year to the year the wife turned 25). Standard errors are clustered at the wife's demographic group. ***significant at 1% level, **at 5%, *at 1%. Note: The data is from Wave 1 of the National Survey of Family and Households (NSFH). Sample is restricted to couples where both the wife and the husband are between 18 and 65 years old and at least one person in the household has positive income. Variable relativeIncome is the share of the household income earned by the wife. Varible wifeEarnsMore is an indicator variable for whether relativeIncome > 0.5. Variables lnWifeIncome and lnHusbIncome are the logs of the wife's and husband's income, respectively. Variables happyMarriage, marriageTrouble, and discussSeparation are binary variables based on respondents' answers about their marriage (details are in the text). All regressions include log of the wife's income, log of the husband's income, log of the total household income, a quadratic in wife and husband's age, indicator variables for wife and husband's race and education (5 categories), region fixed effects, and an indicator variable for whether only the wife is working or only the husband is working. Regressions in Columns (7)-(9) include an indicator variable for whether the wife or the husband is the respondent and have standard errors clustered at the level of the couple. All regressions are weighted using the Wave 1 person weights from NSFH. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. Variable relativeIncome is the share of the household income earned by the wife. Varible wifeEarnsMore is an indicator variable for whether relativeIncome > 0.5. Variable children is an indicator variable for whether there is no child, the youngest child is younger than 3, the youngest child is between 4 and 6 years of age, or the youngest child is older than 6. All regressions include log of the wife's income, log of the husband's income, log of the total household income, year, state, and day of the week fixed effects, the wife and the husband's race, a quadratic in wife and husband's age, and indicator variables for the wife's and the husband's education groups, for whether only the husband is working, and for whether only the wife is working. Furthermore, we also include the interaction of all these controls with an indicator variable for whether the respondent is female. Each observation is weighted using the ATUS/CPS weight. ***significant at 1% level, **at 5%, *at 10%. The data is from Waves 1 and 2 of the National Survey of Family and Households (NSFH). Sample is restricted to couples where both the wife and the husband are between 18 and 65 years old and at least one person in the household has positive income. Variable relativeIncome is the share of the household income earned by the wife. Varible wifeEarnsMore is an indicator variable for whether relativeIncome > 0.5. Variables lnWifeIncome and lnHusbIncome are the logs of the wife's and husband's income, respectively. Variables happyMarriage, marriageTrouble, and discussSeparation are binary variables based on respondents' answers about their marriage (details are in the text). All regressions include log of the wife's income, log of the husband's income, log of the total household income, a quadratic in wife and husband's age, indicator variables for wife and husband's race and education (5 categories), region fixed effects, and an indicator variable for whether only the wife is working or only the husband is working. Regressions in Columns (5) and (6) include an indicator variable for whether the wife or the husband is the respondent and have standard errors clustered at the level of the couple. All regressions are weighted using the Wave 1 person weights from NSFH. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.
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